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Abstract This article investigates the extent to which European Union (EU)
accession and EU funding contribute to the professionalization of interest groups in
Slovenia. Have EU accession and funding had a more profound impact on the
professionalization of interest groups in Slovenia than the shift from socialism to
capitalism? Our novel empirical evidence is drawn from two surveys of interest
groups in Slovenia—the first in 1996 eight years prior to Slovenia’s membership of
the EU (in 2004) and the second in 2012 eight years after its accession. Our findings
show that EU accession and funding accentuate the professionalization of interest
groups. However, these processes are intertwined with the partitocratic role of
national political parties and parties mediate the shape and structure of interest
group professionalization via their decisions on the allocation of EU funding to
groups.
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Introduction
The European Commission (EC) has sought to stimulate the active involvement of civil
society organizations (CSOs)1 in the European policy-making process perceiving these
bodies as central democratic partners. The European Union (EU) White Paper on
Governance (COM 2001) called for a more engaged and vibrant European civil
society perceiving it not as a luxury but a necessity. It (COM 2001) (re-)emphasized
neo-Tocquevillian factors—i.e. the importance of the internal aspects of associa-
tional life for the proper functioning of democracy and democratization—and
sought to make the policy-making process more open, transparent and participatory.
The aim was to create a more democratically balanced process involving the
mobilization of a wider and more diverse range of interests from differing
institutional and territorial levels—e.g. Eurogroups to local groups and organizations
from Western, Southern, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Increasing
pluralism and greater associational vibrancy are seen as helping to bridge the
‘democratic deficit’ by bringing citizens closer to the EU, enhancing European
integration, fostering European identity, and increasing the legitimacy of the EU.
However, the implementation of these strategic objectives has a palpable impact on
the structure and professionalization of interest groups systems in Europe.
While much of the EU’s civil society promotion activities and financial support (EU
programmes or structural fund, e.g. Tacis, Phare, European Social Fund) have been
endeavouring to strengthen democracy, there is a professionalization externality. For
example, Sanchez-Salgado (2011: 5; 9) argues that EU funding has facilitated the
growth of professionalization; it may also help some organizations become more
influential at the expense of the less fortunate who fail to secure such support. Groups
may perceive professionalization as an effective way to develop a viable and
sustainable organization and a means to increase their policy influencing capacities.
However, stimulating organizational professionalization via funding has implications
for both the ‘practice’ and ‘quality’ of democratic politics. For example, as Saurugger
(2012) highlighted, the literature on the professionalization of interest groups and CSOs
more broadly has shown that professionalization is central to several developments,
including: the move from contentious to conventional politics (i.e. outsider to insider
politics); the rise of the professional/expert careerist as opposed to the committed
amateur; and, somewhat ironically, the simultaneous organizational advocacy for
societal-level democratic reform while many professionalized groups eschew internal
democratic habits and routines that see members playing a cameo democratic role.
1 We define CSOs as non-state actors that seek to defend and advance citizens’ interest by influencing
policy outcomes. This encompassing definition includes non-governmental organizations, social
movement organizations, trade unions, interest groups and is aligned with the EU’s broad perspective
on the CSO terrain. In this article, we use the interest group nomenclature. Defining interest groups is not
a straightforward task in a heavily contested field replete with a surfeit of types and sub-types. We follow
Beyers et al. (2008: 1106) who identify three key aspects: Organization—aggregates of ‘‘individuals and/
or organized forms of political behaviour’’; Political Interest—aims to influence policy outcomes; and
Informality—do not seek to hold public office or compete in elections. Beyers et al. (2008: 1107)
conclude, ‘‘The combination of these three features makes the population of interest groups rather
heterogeneous and often difficult to delineate’’.
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This article investigates the impact of EU membership and EU funding on
interest group professionalization in Slovenia. Our research question is: ‘To what
extent does EU accession and EU funding contribute to the professionalization of
interest groups?’. We also investigate if there are any domestic variables that could
play a mediating or direct role in the professionalization process? The article makes
an original and significant contribution in two main ways. First, it addresses the
paucity of research on the effect of EU membership and funding on domestic
interest group systems in CEE countries—we directly address this through our focus
on Slovenia.2 Secondly, we conducted a controlled panel study survey drawing on
primary data from the same interest groups at two points in time (1996 and 2012) (It
should be emphasized that this is not two independent samples.). We argue that EU
accession had a profound impact on the professionalization of interest groups—even
larger than the shift from socialism to capitalism. This is primarily because formal
EU membership not only instantly opened many new opportunities for Slovenian
interest groups to receive EU funding, but also the pot of money available was
significantly greater than in the pre-accession phase. It is also important to note that
the transition to democracy, which included a liberalization phase, allowed for a
gradual adaptation of interest groups to political pluralization and a democratic
context.
Slovenia is also an interesting case because in the pre-EU accession phase the
interest group system’s dependence on external funding was low. Accordingly, the
independent effect of EU funding can be more clearly empirically distinguished
from other determinants of professionalization in Slovenia than in other recent EU
accession countries where the contexts are either blurred or collinear. Furthermore,
Slovenia has several distinctive aspects compared to other CEE countries. First, the
transition to a capitalist economy and the new liberal-democratic order was
smoother. Secondly, in terms of the structure and vibrancy of its interest group
system, Slovenia is arguably the closest of all the CEE to its Western European
peers.3 Thirdly, Slovenia has had comparatively strong trade unions as well as a
long (pre-socialist, socialist and post-socialist) neocorporatist tradition.
To answer our research question—To what extent does EU accession and EU
funding contribute to the professionalization of interest groups? We analyse
empirical data gathered in Slovenia from the same interest groups that were active at
two points in time (organizational surveys in 1996 and 2012) (see Fink-Hafner
1996; Fink-Hafner et al. 2012). The 1996 research was conducted 8 years prior to
Slovenia’s membership of the EU (in 2004) and the 2012 study 8 years after its
accession. This panel approach permits a detailed analysis of interest groups active
in the pre- and post-accession stages and their access to funding. Theoretically, there
are two potential effects on the level of professionalization post-accession. First,
between 1996 and 2012 we expect to see a growth in the level of professionalization
2 Slovenia is a post-socialist country with two million inhabitants covering a territory approximately the
size of Wales, and it became a full EU member in 2004.
3 While the average level of citizen involvement in associations in Slovenia between 1990 and 2010 does
not reach the ‘dizzy heights’ of the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands (? 80%). However, at 57%
it is slightly below (West) Germany (65%) and Belgium (62%), but substantially above Italy (43%),
Hungary (36%), Spain (36%) and Greece (30%) (van Deth and Maloney 2015).
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because of increased availability of funding to EU member state interest groups.
Secondly, the gap in the level of professionalization may be reduced because more
organizations will be able to access these monies. EU funds could in fact level the
professionalization playing field and we may see fewer differences albeit at a higher
level of professionalization in 2012. The main aspects of our analysis include: (1)
the development and comparison of interest group typologies based on various
dimensions of professionalization in 1996 and 2012; (2) the development of a
composite and standardized measurement of professionalization to compare the
general level of interest group professionalization before and after Slovenian
accession (panel); and (3) testing the effect of the EU funding on the level of
professionalization through the application of multiple linear regression models for
both points in time.
Professionalization and EU funding
The adaptation of interest groups and CSOs in response to a diverse variety of
internal and external pressures/incentives has been documented by several scholars
(Buth 2013; Cı´sarˇ 2009; Cı´sarˇ and Vra´blikova´ 2009; Fagan 2010; Jordan and
Maloney 2007; Maloney 2008; Maloney and Jordan 1997; and Saurugger
2007, 2012). In many instances change has been de facto professionalization. This
led to the emergence of Protest Business-type organizations (Maloney and Jordan
1997) with a supporter as opposed to a membership base; a full-time leadership and
paid staff that generate income from subscriptions, donations, the sale of goods and
services and institutional patronage; a leadership that decides organizational
priorities, campaigning strategies and tactics, with supporters having few, if any
internal democratic rights; and organizational staff that have expertise and
accredited professional qualifications in a diverse range of areas—e.g. finance,
law, public relations communication, marketing, recruitment and fundraising. These
groups also hire external consultants (Andreassen et al. 2014) and have internal
organizational training programmes for their staff (Ossewaarde et al. 2008; Hwang
and Powell 2009). This level of professionalization means that they adopt a
technocratic and scientific approach to organizational recruitment, maintenance and
influencing policy outcomes (see Jordan and Maloney 2007; Klu¨ver and Saurugger
2013; McCarthy and Zald [1987] 1994; Saurugger 2012). Accordingly, in our
empirical analyses (below) we measure the level of professionalization via an
additive index of five professionalization indicators including the number of full-
time staff (FTE) and several indicators of competence/knowledge—collaboration
with external experts, in-house training (policy areas and lobbying) and commis-
sioning or conducting research.
EU funding is central to organizational professionalization. However, this money
can have a direct organizational impact. In her sample of CSOs active in the EU
Kro¨ger (2016: 118) found that 81.8% of the environmental groups said ‘… that
being involved in EU policy-making affects the working of their organization’. She
(2016: 166–167) also quoted one Anti-Poverty organization, ‘We wouldn’t exist if
the EU didn’t exist and our existence at the moment is very much related to the
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support we get from the Commission, from the financial support’. Sanchez-Salgado
(2011: 10) argues that EU funding has enticed some groups to change their
advocacy priorities. The Spanish NGO Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la
Libertad (MPDL) moved its central focus from peace and human rights to
humanitarian aid to get access to European funds.
Indeed, public funding may not only stimulate professionalization, it might
demand it. Governments may effectively require or even mandate groups to adopt a
specific organizational structure by setting standards, rules or codes of conduct
leading to the development of a CSO ‘cadre’—e.g. as the EU has done. Cı´sarˇ
(2009), Cı´sarˇ and Vra´blikova´ (2009) and Carmin (2010) provide evidence from the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Cı´sarˇ and Vra´blikova´ (2009: 155)
argue that, by supporting domestic social movement organizations (SMOs) ‘… the
EU directly contributes to their professionalization’. Cı´sarˇ (2009: 22–23; 25) found
that many organizations in the Czech Republic were totally reliant on institutional
patronage and it directly affected their agendas and demands. While Carmin’s
(2010: 200) research on environmental NGOs in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia led her to conclude that the activities and agendas were ‘…
driven by the approach to governance and funding priorities of the European
Commission’.
It is worth emphasizing that even though the level of CSO professionalization in
post-socialist countries is less pronounced, the process began prior to EU
membership. There are pre- and post-EU accession factors and country variations
in post-socialist regimes (just as there are in Western European polities). There are
also differences in the nature of the professionalization process between various
types of interest groups within national systems. However, within Western and CEE
member states there may also be some copying of professionalized organizational
structures, processes and strategies because these are perceived as highly likely to
deliver success in both organizational maintenance and influencing policy
outcomes. Interest groups have two axiomatic and interdependent raison d’eˆtre:
effective representation that leads to policy-making influence; and organizational
survival—as Wilson ([1974], 1995: 10) famously noted, ‘Whatever else organiza-
tions seek, they seek to survive’. Accordingly, it is not surprising that aspiring
groups seeking greater riches and policy success choose to adopt an organizational
structure akin to those groups perceived as highly successful—i.e. the highly
professionalized cohort. The key assumption is that certain characteristics and
organizational structures are more likely to deliver success.
We analyse the extent to which EU funding (and EU accession) (independent
variable) contribute to the professionalization (dependent variable) of interest
groups in Slovenia. Our main theoretical hypothesis is that EU funding has a direct
and positive impact on interest group professionalization. Our subsidiary hypothesis
is that the impact of EU funding on differences in level of professionalization will
be weaker post-accession (drawing on our panel data from 1996 and 2012). We
expect this to be the case because Slovenian groups had limited access to EU
funding in the pre-accession era and in the post-accession period the overall level
and availability of (EU) funds was greater. Accordingly, we expect higher level of
professionalization in 2012 but at the same time we expect EU funding to be a
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weaker predictor of differences related to interest group professionalization in
Slovenia.
Before our empirical analysis of the impact of EU accession and funding, we
need to understand the contextual background of the Slovenian interest group
system. Importantly, are there any crucial domestic variables that could play an
important mediating role in this process? (See also, Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Fazekas
et al. 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013).
The Slovenian interest group universe and EU accession
Slovenia has a long established and vibrant associational life dating back to the
Nineteenth century (see, Kranjc 1986; and Stanojevic´ 2010). However, it
experienced periods of dictatorship between WWI and WWII and the succeeding
authoritarian (Yugoslavian) socialist regime. Slovenian interest groups had very few
policy-making participation opportunities until the 1980s because the ruling elite
discouraged political pluralism. Despite such constraints many groups emerged
from the bottom-up in addition to those established top-down by the regime and the
focus of their activities was largely voluntary work. Under the socialist system,
policy relevant interest group activities were filtered in several ways and there was
the de facto compulsory accession of interest associations into the umbrella
organization—the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP). The SAWP
was charged with preparing consensual political opinions and proposals under the
leadership of the League of Communists (which was also a member of the SAWP)
for sessions of legislative bodies. However, there were some notable highly
professionalized organizations—e.g. the League of Veterans of the National
Liberation War, trade unions and the Chambers of Commerce. It is relatively
unsurprising that reformed (former socialist) trade unions and the Chamber of
Commerce retained their resource base (including real estate property) and power
after the transition to democracy. However, by the 1990s trade unions faced
increased competition due to the establishment of new unions and the Chamber of
Commerce lost both its agenda-setting power to propose bills and (subsequently) its
official monopoly as the representative of business interests.
Slovenian interest groups also had to adapt to new welfare policies in the 1990s
and the transformation of the welfare regime was an important domestic factor in
the professionalization process. Economic liberalization permitted the creation of
new non-profit organizations and stimulated organizational professionalization via
new state-funded contracts for social services (Kolaricˇ et al. 2002, 2009). The
overall direction of the new political system evolved closely in line with the general
post-socialist tendency towards partitocracy—similar to other third wave democ-
ratization countries (Linz 1990; Morlino 1996; Lewis 2000; Magone 2014). In the
early stages of the democratization process, many interest groups were ideologically
divided in line with the main ideological party cleavages (communist vs anti-
communist) (Fink-Hafner 1998).
In Slovenia liberalization and modernization began in the early 1980s, allowing for
the mushrooming of new autonomously organized interest groups. During the second
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half of the decade the Slovenian constitution was gradually amended leading to
multiparty elections in 1990. During this stage, both old socialist and new post-socialist
organizations had to adapt to new circumstances, including increased competition. The
growing power and policy impact of trade unions during the 1990s led to the emergence
of neo-corporatism. Although Slovenia became an independent state in 1991 it very
quickly oriented itself towards European integration and became a full EU member in
2004. All these developments reshaped the interest group environment. However, full
EU membership was a step change that significantly change the milieu. Almost
‘overnight’ the funding opportunities available to Slovenian groups increased.
The professionalization of the Slovenian interest group systems in 1996
and 2012
Research design, data, and methods
As outlined above, our main research question addresses the impact of the EU
accession process and funding on the professionalization of interest groups in
Slovenia. As our data includes information on a wide variety of organizations, we
draw on a broad operationalization of professionalization. In line with our
theoretical perspective, our operationalization extends beyond paid staff, funding
etc. It encompasses other professionalization indicators including, in-house
professional training, collaboration with external experts and the commissioning
or conducting research. In a first step, we analyse interest group professionalization
at two points in time that are equidistant from Slovenia EU accession. Following
this we test the extent to which the EU has had an impact on interest group
professionalization in Slovenia.
We begin by seeking to identify any professionalization-type changes during the
accession process—i.e. both the level of professionalization and the population
structure (typology of interest groups regarding the key aspects of professionaliza-
tion). We use hierarchical cluster analysis to scan the interest group population
structure based on empirical data in 1996 and 2012. In a second step, we test the
influence of EU funding on the professionalization of interest groups.
Our data are drawn from two face-to-face standardized surveys of 70 and 97
interest group representatives in 1996 and 2012, respectively (Fink-Hafner 1996;
Fink-Hafner et al. 2012). The organizations were selected according to their
visibility and lobbying activity—i.e. only visible and active organizations were
surveyed. Organizations were selected on the basis of the results of previous
empirical research (Zajc 1994; Zajc et al. 1991, 2008) and additional consultations
with scholars and experts in the relevant policy sectors. Our research is not
conducted on a sample of interest group population in Slovenia, but rather on all
organizations identified as active in eleven policy fields at both points in time.4 The
4 In 1996 a population of 104 active organizations was identified, all were invited to cooperate in the
survey and finally 70 organizations responded (67.3% response rate). In 2012 a population of 109 active
organizations was identified, and 97 organizations took part in the survey (90.7% response rate). The
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questionnaires used in 1996 and 2012 were largely identical—the 2012 question-
naire was adapted to take account of EU membership. To allow cross-time
comparison and observation of changes on the level of individual interest groups
both data sets (1996 and 2012) were merged to create a panel of the 52
organizations that participated in both projects (and for which valid data for relevant
variables were available). In terms of organizational type, the respondents included,
professional societies, various chambers and the league of agriculture cooperatives,
trade unions, associations representing people with particular diseases and
disabilities, and several public interest groups and other social organizations—e.g.
tenants, students. The surveys included professionalized and non-professionalized
organizations: (a) in 1996 there were 12 organizations without any employees and 7
organizations with more than 15 FTE; (b) in 2012 there were 10 organizations with
no employees and 9 organizations with more than 15 FTE (Table 1).
Our general analytical model contains two main phenomena (variables) related to
interest groups in Slovenia—professionalization and the EU accession process.
1. The professionalization of interest groups is the dependent variable in the
model. It is measured through various indicators of professionalization and
covers the main aspects: (a) staff employment and (b) competences (knowl-
edge). The indicators include:
(a) Number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff;
(b) Answers to the following questions about activities in the last 2 years:
• To what extent has your organization collaborated with external
experts, measured on the 5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5
(continuously);
• How much time has your organization devoted to in-house profes-
sional training of staff in the core field of its activity (i.e. keeping up
to date with policy developments), measured on the 5-point scale
from 1 (no time at all) to 5 (a lot of time);
Table 1 Interest groups in the
panel according to the number
of full-time paid staff (FTE)
Data source: Formation of
Policy Network and Lobbying in
Slovenia 1996 and 2012 (Fink-
Hafner 1996; Fink-Hafner et al.
2012)
No. of FTE 1996 2012
IG Freq. IG % IG Freq. IG %
Without FTE 12 23.1 10 19.3
Up to 2 FTE 15 28.9 5 9.6
3–5 FTE 11 21.2 13 25.0
6–10 FTE 5 9.6 11 21.2
11–15 FTE 2 3.8 4 7.6
Above 15 FTE 7 13.4 9 17.3
Footnote 4 continued
following eleven policy fields were covered in the survey: economic, social, housing, agricultural, dis-
ability, environment, health, education, culture, sports and marketing/public relations.
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• How much time has your organization devoted to the in-house
training of staff on effective lobbying strategies and tactics, measured
on the 5-point scale from 1 (no time at all) to 5 (a lot of time);
• How much time has your organization devoted to the commissioning
or conducting research, measured on the 5-point scale, from 1 (no
time at all) to 5 (a lot of time).
The principal component analysis confirmed our expectations that all five
indicators were located in the same dimension: in both time points only one
component had an eigenvalue higher than 1 (KMO in both time points was higher than
0.65). To measure the level of professionalization, an additive index of five
professionalization indicators was created (with acceptable reliability level: Cron-
bach’s alpha in 1996 was 0.71 and in 2012 it was 0.64). When computing the index, the
number of FTE had the same weight as the other four indicators taken together: the
scale for the number of FTEs ranged from 0 (no FTE) to 16 (or more FTEs), the scale
for each of the other four indicators ran from 0 (no time, never) to 4 (a lot of time,
permanently). Finally, the index was ‘standardized’ on the scale from 0 to 10.
The first step of the analysis took an inductive approach by ‘scanning’ the interest
group population structure at 1996 and 2012 using the five indicators (dimensions) of
professionalization outlined above. This led to the development (via hierarchical cluster
analysis) of two discrete interest group typologies for the 1996 and 2012 samples.
2. EU Funding is the main explanatory phenomenon (independent variable). The
key research question is: To what extent does EU funding directly affect the
interest group professionalization process? It is hypothesized as having a direct
and positive impact on interest group professionalization and is included in the
model in two ways:
• As a ‘temporal dimension’ in the comparative design—comparing interest
group professionalization before (1996) and after Slovenian EU accession
(2012). Given that we do not have time-series data, we can only observe two
time points. In fact we have a ‘natural’ quasi-experimental design: (a) we
observe the same 52 interest groups in 1996 and 2012 and have two
measurements (variables) of the professionalization level; (b) between both
measurements Slovenia joined the EU and we assume that this change has
an impact on the professionalization level; (c) however, unlike in real
experimental design, we cannot keep other possible factors fixed and we do
not have a control group (organizations not experiencing EU accession),
hence our use of the quasi-experimental design label; and
• As a dichotomous variable ‘EU funding’, the survey question asked if
organizations had received income (simply yes or no) from EU sources (e.g.
Tacis, Phare, European Social Fund). This was analysed in linear regression
models for 1996 and 2012 as our main predictor of interest group
professionalization.
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Organizational maintenance and professionalization is dependent on numerous
financial sources. In the survey, we asked about 19 types of resources (EU funding
was only one) and about the three key sources. Data for 2012 show that among the
52 organizations only one group (a small trade union) receives funds from only one
source—membership fees. Whereas, 90% of organizations receive funds from at
least four different sources including, membership fees, sponsorship, state budget,
commercial activities, conference fees, EU funds, contract with the government, and
lottery.
In the second step, we conducted a linear regression analysis on the 1996 and
2012 data: (a) the level of professionalization (measured with the professionaliza-
tion index) was included in the regression model as a dependent variable; and
(b) the financing of interest groups from EU Funds was included as a main
independent variable (predictor). At both points in time the effect of EU finance was
controlled for by including other possible factors of professionalization. In line with
several observations in the interest group literature on ‘control variables’ and more
recent arguments related to the potential impact of national contextual factors on the
distribution of EU funds to specially selected interest groups (see Mungiu-Pippidi
2013; Fazekas et al. 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013). The model included the
following four additional independent variables: (1) (non)economic interest group;
(2) interest group-political party alliances; (3) ownership of business premises; and
(4) interest group age prior to transition. In order to test how 1996 professional-
ization affected the 2012 level we added one additional model using the level of
professionalization in 1996 as an additional predictor of professionalization in 2012.
Findings 1: temporal similarities and differences in typologies of interest
group professionalization
In this section, our findings from two different analyses are presented. First, we
compared the structure of interest groups at both time points (types of interest
groups with regard to the level of professionalization)—and using our panel data—
also shifts in interest group type between 1996 and 2012. Second, we analysed
changes in the general level of interest group professionalization between 1996 and
2012.
As outlined above, to observe the interest group population structure according to
the level and type of professionalization we developed typologies based on the five
key indicators of different dimensions of professionalization and a hierarchical
cluster analysis of 52 organizations. Groups can be high on some dimensions of
professionalization and low on others, and we also have some organization that are
high on several measures of professionalization. The hierarchical cluster analysis
identifies differences and similarities between interest groups across these five
indicators. It then classifies them according to their similarities. Ward’s5 method
5 Ward’s method relies on an analysis of the variance approach to assess the distance between clusters.
At each step, it seeks to join clusters (objects that are clustered) to minimize the increase in the error sum
of squares of group means (see Ward 1963).
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was used for clustering, while the squared Euclidian distance for standardized data
was used to measure the (dis)similarities among the cases (interest groups). The
number of clusters was fixed by cutting the classification tree at the same point (the
relative distance between the cases combined into a cluster) for 1996 and 2012
which generated four interest group clusters in 1996 and five in 2012 (see Table 2).
At both time points, we have two extreme clusters. First, one with values above the
average for all five indicators of professionalization—labelled ‘Highly profession-
alized’ (including trade unions, a chamber, students’ organization, association of
paraplegics)—and a second with values below the average for all five indicators—
called ‘Amateurs’ (e.g. leisure time groups, the association for solar energy, some
organizations of professions). The gap between the highly professionalized and all
the other types is wider in 1996 (the average difference between the mean of highly
professionalized cluster and the means of the others is 5.40). In 2012 the average
difference is 3.40. In general, we see a significant increase in the overall level of
professionalization overtime: the average value measured by index of profession-
alization increased from 3.67 (Std. error of Mean = 0.32; Std. deviation = 2.33) in
1996 to 4.61 (Std. error of Mean = 0.33; Std. deviation = 2.40) in 2012 (Table 2).
We also see that the two professionalized clusters in 2012 (‘highly professionalized’
and ‘staff-rich’) include more interest groups than their two counterparts in 1996
(‘highly professionalized’ and ‘semi-professionalized’). This provides support for
our thesis that EU accession has contributed to the professionalization of Slovenia
interest groups.
The data not only show an increase in the overall level of professionalization, but
also greater variation. This is clear from the increase in the different types of interest
groups between 1996 and 2012—mostly related to the increased diversification of
types between two extremes (i.e. highly professionalized and amateur groups,
Table 1). One of the major changes is the emergence of the ‘staff-rich’ group cluster
with surprisingly average professionalization in terms of the other professionaliza-
tion measures. Staff-rich groups include several trade unions and medical
professional associations, chambers of commerce and international charitable orga-
nizations. These groups employ highly professional staff with policy relevant and
lobbying/advocacy expertise and in all likelihood do not need to rely on external
expert collaborations or internal staff training programmes to the same extent as
other less staff-rich organizations—hence their lower overall professionalization
score in our model.
Since our analysis is based on panel data, we are both able to observe changes
between 1996 and 2012 at aggregate level and also how individual interest groups
changed their position in the typology in the same period. Based on simple bivariate
cross-tabulation, we can see that the two main 1996 clusters that split to the greatest
extent were the semi-professionalized and amateur, and that two new (2012) clusters
emerged—staff-rich and research-oriented interest group types (see Fig. 1). At the
same time, we see that the groups in the highly professionalized cluster in 1996 have
maintained this position in 2012. These organizations are located in the ‘highly
professionalized’ or ‘staff-rich’ clusters. On the ‘amateur’ side, interest groups have
taken much more diverse trajectories with the majority (17 of 26) being found in
three 2012 ‘amateur’ clusters (see Fig. 1). All-in-all, it is the staff-rich cluster in
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2012 that grew with interest group shifts from all the 1996 clusters except the
‘Amateurs’. While the majority of groups increased their values in the index of
professionalization, four of them (e.g. the Union of Ecological Movements of
Slovenia, and the Association of Tenants of Slovenia) remained on the same level
and eleven declined (with the biggest losers including the League of Paraplegics of
Slovenia, the Red Cross umbrella organization, and the League of Consumers of
Slovenia). The groups that gained the most in the index of professionalization
included: the League of Societies of Pensioners of Slovenia; the new Confederation
of Trade Unions 90 of Slovenia; ALTRA—the Committee for Innovations in
Mental Health).
Finding 2: the impact of EU funding on interest group
professionalization
The effect of EU funding on the level of interest group professionalization was
tested in two steps. First, at each point in time separately by using bivariate analysis
(comparing means). Second, by multivariate linear regression analysis including
four control variables that were identified in the theoretical section as relevant
mediators of the impact of the EU on interest group professionalization—interest
group type (economic, non-economic), linkages with a political party (political
Considerable / strong splitting direction
Somewhat / weak splitting direction
Most divided 1996 clusters (types) over time
The main 2012 ‘receivers’ (receiving from more than two 1996 clusters)
1996
2012
Highly 
professio-
nalized
Semi-
professio-
nalized
Expert
dependent 
amateurs
Highly 
professio-
nalized
Internal
educaon 
amateurs
Amateurs
Research
oriented 
amateurs
(n = 8) (n = 18) (n = 12) (n = 14)
(n = 10) (n = 19) (n = 9) (n = 8)(n = 6)
Staff-rich 
Amateurs
Fig. 1 Moving from the 1996 interest group types to the 2012 interest group types
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party invitations to interest groups to form an alliance6), resources (ownership of
business premises), and age (before the transition).
As noted above, interest groups do not rely solely on a single financial source.
Therefore, we did not expect that European funds would be the only source that
could foster professionalization. In order to determine which other income sources
might have an impact, we first tested the relationship between professionalization
and sources of funding.
In the first step, we tested bivariate associations between professionalization
(separately for the typology and the index of professionalization) and funding
sources. When applying cross-tabulation for the typology of professionalization and
comparison of means for the index of professionalization, we detected both positive
and negative associations:
(a) ‘Positive’ Associations—a higher level of professionalization is more likely
when the following sources are present: income from commercial activities,
EU funds, and membership fees from organizations
(b) ‘Negative’ Associations—a lower level of professionalization is more likely
when the following sources are present: sponsorship, individual membership
fees, contributions of individuals, local community (municipality) budget,
and charity events.
Due to the low number of cases (n = 52), we cannot include a high number of
independent variables in our regression models. We selected independent variables
based on our main hypothetical starting point regarding the influence of EU funding
and also on the bivariate analysis (outlined above). When we include sources of
funding, those with asymmetrical distributions were excluded in the regression
model as predictors for the professionalization level. At both time points, only two
variables were statistically significant (p\ 0.05) with high standardized regression
coefficient (b[ 0.3): EU funds and own sources. Accordingly, we included
‘funding from own sources’ as a fifth control variable in the final regression model.
The relationship between interest group professionalization and EU funding is
clear at the bivariate level. At both points in time, the average values of the
professionalization index for interest groups receiving financial resources from EU
funds are 6.70 in 1996 and 5.52 in 2012. These are significantly higher than the
average values for the interest groups without EU funding (3.03 in 1996 and 3.50 in
2012, see Fig. 2). As discussed above the level of professionalization (index)
increased from 3.67 to 4.61 in the 1996–2012 period.
However, is it the same predictors at both points in time? We sought to answer
this question with the help of multiple linear regression analysis. The data show that
even when controlling for other possible effects in the framework of the regression
models (1.1 and 2.1) in 1996 and 2012 EU funding emerges as a statistically
significant predictor of professionalization (Table 3).7 However, there is an
6 The survey question was: Have any political parties looked for an alliance with your organisation/group
in respect of an individual case? (1—yes; 2—no; 9—don’t know, cannot estimate; 0—n.a.).
7 We also used other methods (analysis of variance, logistic regression) which suggested the same
conclusion.
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important difference between 1996 and 2012. Regression coefficients show that in
1996 only EU funding (b = 0.539) and an interest group’s own commercial sources
(b = 0.326) are statistically significant predictors (p\ 0.10). While in 2012 five
independent variables are significant (p\ 0.10): EU funding, ownership of business
premises, funding from own commercial sources, linkages with a political party, and
economic interest groups (Table 3). EU funding appears to be less important in
2012 than 1996. However, this is largely because there were more EU funds
available to Slovenian interest groups after EU accession. The number of
organization in receipt of EU funding in 1996 and 2012 was 9 and 29, respectively.
So we have a higher overall level of professionalization because of the greater
availability of funds, but the differences between organizations relate to other
domestic factors (e.g. political party linkage or organizational characteristics) more
than EU finding. Once we add the level of professionalization in 1996 to the 2012
model, then the predictive power of the same five predictors changes slightly: (a) the
predictive power of EU funding (b = 0.287) and being an economic interest group
(b = 0.211) increases marginally; and (b) the predictive power of being in an
alliance with a political party, ownership of business premises, and funding from
own commercial sources decreases significantly. Furthermore, the professionaliza-
tion level in 1996 is the main predictor of the professionalization in 2012
(b = 0.422)—highly professionalized interest groups in 1996 have higher levels of
professionalization in 2012 (Table 3, Model 2.2). The result indicates that
professionalization should be understood as a process that EU accession and
Fig. 2 Level of professionalization and EU funding of interest groups (mean values of
professionalization index measured on the scale from 0 to 10)
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funding accentuate. The influence of the initial level of professionalization also
indirectly increases the 2012 professionalization level. Additional bivariate and
multiple regression analyses indicate that the indirect influence goes via: (1) party
linkages (the 1996 professionalization level affects interest group-party linkages in
2012, and interest groups with party linkages get better access to EU funding); and
(2) economic resources (the 1996 professionalization affects the 2012 interest group
ownership of business premises which further increases professionalization). The
professionalization of interest organizations in receipt of EU funding becomes a
virtuous circle for these groups—professionalization begets professionalization.
The data on interest group-political party linkages show, that in 1996 and 2012,
22 and 17 interest groups, respectively, had links with political parties. Interest
groups with party linkages at both points are generally those with large numbers of
members and mostly highly professionalized (e.g. trade unions, Chamber of
Commerce, the league of pensioners’ societies), and/or well-placed to contribute to
policy-making and the implementation of particular policies (e.g. in the housing and
environmental fields). In both models, political party linkages in 2012 appear to be
important. Accordingly, we conducted an additional bivariate analysis of the
Table 3 Predictors of interest groups’ professionalization—linear regression with regression coefficients
(B) and standardized regression coefficients (b) (models for 1996 and 2012)
1996 2012
Model 1.1 Model 2.1 Model 2.2
B b B b B b
Intercept 2.462 1.689 1.670
EU funding 3.254 ***0.539 1.322 **0.277 1.374 **0.287
Alliance with a political party - 0.179 - 0.038 1.271 **0.251 0.887 *0.175
Economic interest group 0.399 0.086 0.941 *0.198 1.004 **0.211
Ownership of business premises 0.276 0.058 1.628 ***0.343 1.069 **0.225
Funding from own commercial
sources
1.553 **0.326 1.346 **0.273 0.903 *0.183
Established before 1988 - 0.250 - 0.054 - 0.763 - 0.160 - 0.412 - 0.087
Professionalization in 1996 - - - - 2.544 ***0.422
N 51 52 52
F 7.102*** 8.258*** 12.832***
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.461 0.619
All independent variables were binary (0—absence; 1—presence). Professionalization in 1996 was
dichotomized with the threshold in the middle of the 10-point scale. We have analysed a ‘sample’ that is a
‘population’ of visible and active organizations. This is why p values do not actually represent error
probabilities when making inference from sample statistics to population parameters. We only treat them
as additional information about the strength and the importance of effects represented by regression
coefficients
Own analysis based on data from the study Formation of Policy Network and Lobbying in Slovenia 1996
and 2012 (Fink-Hafner 1996; Fink-Hafner et al. 2012)
***p\ 0.01; **p\ 0.05; *p\ 0.10
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association between national political party linkages and EU funding. This
association is statistically significant (v2 = 7.236; df = 1; p\ 0.01; Cra-
mer’s V = 0.373): 82.4% of interest groups (14 out of 17) linked to a political
party were in receipt of EU funding. While among those groups not affiliated to
political parties, EU funding was present in only 42.9% of cases (15 out of 35). It
appears that party linkages affect the level of professionalization not only directly as
can be seen from the regression model (Table 2), but also indirectly through EU
funding. In addition to this, participants in the stakeholder meeting we organized
also stressed that excellent links to, and good working relationship with political
parties was crucial to the securing EU funding. Our findings are in line with recent
research that highlighted national political parties’ ability to extract significant
resources from the state (Rupnik and Zielonka 2013: 13–14) and that EU funds add
to the pool of particularistic allocated public resources (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).
Based on the existing case studies, it seems that national political parties can and do
have a mediating influence on the distribution of EU funds to national organiza-
tions—as also suggested by Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), Fazekas et al. (2013) and
Dimulescu et al. (2013). However, as shown in the case of Slovenia—the previously
existing level of interest group professionalization sets the national group landscape,
which may be further boosted by EU funds.
In general, our analyses show that EU funding is an important factor (predictor)
of interest group professionalization. While there is higher probability of higher
levels of professionalization in cases where EU funding is present, it does not follow
that EU monies are the sole driver of interest group professionalization. Data for
2012 show that:
(a) among 19 organizations from the ‘staff-rich’ cluster only 4 (21.1%) say that
EU funds are a key source;
(b) among 10 organizations from ‘highly professionalized’ cluster only two
organizations say that EU funds are their key source.
Each of these ‘highly professionalized’ or ‘staff-rich’ organizations with EU
funds as their main source has at least four additional income sources (e.g.
government agencies, membership fees, commercial income, and sponsorship). If
we look at all income sources the majority of highly professionalized organizations
(over 70%) receive EU funds, while only 35% of organizations from three ‘amateur’
clusters get EU money.
Conclusions
The findings in this article are in line with our main hypothesis that we expected to
see an increase in the level of professionalization between 1996 and 2012—largely
because of EU accession and the greater availability of EU funds. However, our
analysis showed that there was a larger differentiation in interest group type in terms
of professionalization—i.e. the differences in professionalization among interest
groups are lower in 2012 than 1996. This confirms our subsidiary hypothesis that the
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impact of EU funding on differences in levels of professionalization would be
weaker post-accession.
Our research demonstrated that EU accession and funding affects the national
interest group professionalization process. Our panel data analysis revealed that the
population of active interest groups in the eleven policy fields studied in Slovenia
has been changing dramatically in terms of the level of professionalization. Based
on a more refined and theoretically informed definition of professionalization (going
beyond simply equating professionalization with the number of full-time staff)
various interest group types emerged in the 1996 and 2012—four in 1996 and five in
2012. Additionally, EU accession and funding had an important impact on interest
group adaptation (There are reasonable grounds to assume this impact is being felt
across the entire interest group universe in Slovenia.)
The overall trend in the interest group system has been towards increasing
professionalization (the average value of the index increased from 3.7 in 1996 to 4.6
in 2012). There was a greater density of professionalized organizations in 2012,
staff-rich interest groups emerged; and many of the amateur-type groups identified
in 1996 were embracing several aspects of the professionalized approach to
organizational maintenance, structure and lobbying/advocacy in 2012.
Although ‘the EU factor’ has proven to be among the main predictors explaining
interest group professionalization in Slovenia, it was not the only one. Interest
group-party political linkages were also an important predictor in 2012. Indeed, the
impact of the EU was mediated by national factors. The empirical findings highlight
the peculiar inter-linkage of domestic post-socialist political context (with its
partitocratic tendencies) and party-related clientelism as variables that filter the
EU’s impact on domestic interest group professionalization. After Slovenian
accession political parties played an important mediating role in the distribution of
EU funds.
Our findings are in line with Sanchez-Salgado (2011: 17) and suggest that EU
funding (and accession) has a significant impact on the structure of civic
organizations. Our findings also connect to the literature that highlights the
intervening role of political parties in post-authoritarian political systems (Magone
2014), especially with regard to the filtering of EU professionalization impacts. The
key conclusion is not only that domestic contextual factors in general, but national
political parties in particular, interpose and mediate the Europeanization process in
the field of interest groups and that they do that via control of the dissemination of
EU funds. This type of relationship may also exist in other countries with
partitocratic national decision-making on allocation of EU funds. In the time
honoured academic tradition, additional research is needed to assess the extent to
which these findings are more widely generalizable.
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